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11 days ago

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Resource updated
The “threats/en.json” file was changed. 2 weeks ago
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Malware is malicious software installed on a digital device such as a computer, server, or mobile phone, to compromise the device. Malware can do many different things, but against anarchists and other rebels, it typically aims to gain visibility into the compromised device through remote screen capture and remote keylogging (recording the keys pressed on a keyboard), and to track the location of the device (in the case of phones).

Malware can be installed on a device:

- Remotely, typically through phishing[^https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing] via email or text-based messages (SMS, etc.) To be effective, phishing often requires the target to open a malicious file or link.
- By [physical accessing](tl://techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/physical-access.html) the device.

See the ["Targeted malware" topic](res://index.html#topic=targeted-malware).
 
2 weeks ago
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An IMSI-catcher (also known as a *Stingray*) is a device used to collect information about all mobile phones that are turned on in a limited area (from a few meters to several hundred meters) around it. A passive IMSI-catcher simply listens to the traffic, while an active IMSI-catcher acts as a "fake" cell tower between the phones and the legitimate cell towers.

An IMSI-catcher can collect the following information about the phones around it:

- Their numbers.
- Their IMSI[^An International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number is a number that uniquely identifies a SIM card.] and IMEI[^An International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number is a number that uniquely identifies a phone.] numbers.
- Data and metadata about their activity: the content of SMS and regular calls, the list of visited websites, metadata about the use of end-to-end encrypted messaging applications (e.g. when Signal is used and the approximate size of messages sent or received through Signal).

An adversary can use an IMSI-catcher to link people and phone numbers. For example:

- At a public demonstration, to record the phone numbers of all the phones present at the demonstration and later obtain the names associated with those phone numbers through the [collaboration of mobile network operators](tl://techniques/service-provider-collaboration/mobile-network-operators.html).
- As part of a [physical surveillance](tl://techniques/physical-surveillance.html) operation to record the target's phone number or the phone numbers of people in contact with the target.

An adversary can also use an IMSI-catcher to record phone activity. For example:

- To record the activity of a target phone without requiring the collaboration of the mobile network operator (which, in some contexts, may require a warrant).
- To record the activity of a target phone when the adversary knows where the phone is being used, but doesn't know its phone number.

See the ["IMSI-catchers" topic](res://index.html#topic=imsi-catchers).
 
2 weeks ago
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You can follow digital best practices, and in particular use security-oriented operating systems with Full Disk Encryption (FDE) and strong passwords, to make it harder for an adversary to bypass authentication on your digital devices. For example:

- On computers, you can use the Linux FDE called LUKS, which is used by many Linux systems, such as Debian[^https://debian.org] and Tails,[^https://tails.net] and which the forensics department of the German federal police was unable to decrypt after [a year of effort](res://index.html#parkbank).
- On phones, you can use GrapheneOS, whose FDE makes it difficult for an adversary to guess the encryption password by brute force: after 140 failed attempts, each is delayed for a full day.[^https://grapheneos.org/faq#encryption]
 
2 weeks ago
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Targeted digital surveillance is the targeted collection and analysis of digital data and communications.

Extremely advanced techniques exist[^https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#some-advanced-targeted-techniques] in the arsenal of nation-State actors, but the focus here is on techniques that are more likely to be used against anarchists and other rebels.

See the ["Digital surveillance" topic](res://index.html#topic=digital-surveillance).
 
2 weeks ago
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Covert physical surveillance is the direct observation of people or activities when the surveillance operators do not want to be detected by their targets.

# Mobile

A mobile physical surveillance operation is typically conducted by a surveillance team of five to twenty operators using multiple vehicles, and typically begins with a static phase: staking out the location where the target is believed to be, such as their home or place of employment. When the target leaves the stakeout location, the surveillance team begins following them and the surveillance operation transitions into a mobile phase. The surveillance operation then alternates between static phases (when the target stops) and mobile phases (when the target starts moving again).

Examples of mobile physical surveillance techniques include:

- Using an appropriate mode of travel based on the target's mode of travel. For example, if the target is in a vehicle, the surveillance team must use vehicles, but if the target is on foot, the surveillance team may prefer to use operators on foot.
- Using cover and concealment to avoid detection by the target. For example, surveillance vehicles can hide behind other vehicles, and surveillance operators on foot can blend in with pedestrian traffic.
- Rotating which surveillance operator or vehicle is closest to the target to limit the risk of the target noticing that someone is following them.

Mobile physical surveillance may be facilitated by:

- A [tracking device](tl://techniques/covert-surveillance-devices/location.html) installed on the target's vehicle or bike.
- Real-time geolocation of the target's phone, obtained with the [collaboration of mobile network operators](tl://techniques/service-provider-collaboration/mobile-network-operators.html).
- [Aerial surveillance](tl://techniques/physical-surveillance/aerial.html), such as a drone following the target from a distance.

# Static

Static physical surveillance is the observation of a target when the target cannot move, or the surveillance operators do not intend to follow them if they move. A static physical surveillance operation is typically conducted by a surveillance team using one or more vehicles.

An example of a static physical surveillance operation is parking a surveillance vehicle in front of a target's home, with surveillance operators inside the vehicle watching the entrance to the home.

# Arrest

Generally, a surveillance team will not attempt to arrest its target during a covert physical surveillance operation. On rare occasions, however, this may happen if the surveillance team has gathered enough information about the target's activities to incriminate them and deems it necessary to arrest the target immediately (e.g. to prevent a crime).

# See also

- [Surveillance Countermeasures](res://index.html#surveillance-countermeasures) about the principles and techniques of covert physical surveillance.
- [Measures Against Surveillance](res://index.html#measures-surveillance) for insights into how police and intelligence agencies conduct covert physical surveillance.
- The ["Physical surveillance" topic](res://index.html#topic=physical-surveillance).
 
2 weeks ago
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During a demonstration, you can take down drones with fireworks, hack them, or blind them with lasers. See also [5 widely accessible ways to take down drones](res://index.html#5-ways).
 
2 weeks ago
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Aerial physical surveillance is the direct observation of people or activities from the air for the purpose of gathering information. In many countries, helicopters have traditionally been the predominant tool for this purpose. As drones become less expensive, their use is becoming more common. Surveillance planes are also occasionally used and are much more covert than helicopters.

Examples of aerial physical surveillance include:

- Observing the crowd during demonstrations or gatherings, often as part of an [overt](tl://techniques/physical-surveillance/overt.html) surveillance operation.
- Improving the chances of successfully following the target of surveillance during a [covert](tl://techniques/physical-surveillance/covert.html) surveillance operation, especially at night.
- Locating suspects soon after an action took place and the adversary has been alerted, especially in rural areas or at night (in the case of an arson in Germany, a police helicopter responded by flying over the area the same night[^https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2023/11/13/munich-germany-geothermal-energy-gets-hot-and-not-only]).
- Locating suspects as part of routine [police patrols](tl://techniques/police-patrols.html) in areas at risk of criminal activity.

Surveillance planes can monitor entire cities, photographing up to 80 square kilometers per second, allowing for the slow-motion reconstruction of virtually any outdoor movement,[^https://theintercept.com/2020/04/09/baltimore-police-aerial-surveillance] with high-quality video at night.[^https://theintercept.com/document/2021/08/31/motion-to-suppress-aerial-surveillance-evidence-in-u-s-vs-muhammed-momtaz-alazhari]

See the ["Aerial surveillance" topic](res://index.html#topic=aerial-surveillance).
 
2 weeks ago
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You can [disable](res://index.html#destroy-cameras) surveillance cameras.
 
2 weeks ago
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Mass video surveillance (also known as *close-circuit television*, or *CCTV*) is the large-scale collection, storage and analysis of video and audio data from video surveillance cameras. Mass video surveillance aims to capture the identity of people who pass through a space and to extend its coverage to as much space as possible. Some countries now have more surveillance cameras than citizens.

# Collection

Sources of CCTV footage include:

- Cameras in the street or in other public locations.
- Cameras in private buildings (e.g. shops, offices).
- Public transport cameras on buses, trains, highways, etc.
- Home surveillance systems such as Amazon Ring.
- In-vehicle surveillance systems like those found on Teslas.

CCTV cameras can vary widely in quality, range, night vision capabilities, presence of microphones, etc.

# Storage

After its collection, CCTV footage is often stored for some time (from days to indefinite durations) before being erased.

# Analysis

An adversary can analyze CCTV footage:

- In real time if the cameras are integrated into a central network. Real-time analysis can take place either as part of routine surveillance or during exceptional events (e.g. demonstrations).
- Retroactively if the CCTV footage has been stored. Retroactive analysis can help identify a suspect by their [face](tl://techniques/forensics/facial-recognition.html), [gait](tl://techniques/forensics/gait-recognition.html), [voice](tl://techniques/forensics/linguistics.html), etc.

Analysis of CCTV footage can be performed:

- By humans.
- By automated systems such as automated license plate readers or [facial recognition systems](tl://techniques/forensics/facial-recognition.html).

# See also

- [You Can't Catch What You Can't See: Against Video Surveillance](res://index.html#catch-see).
- The topics "[Video surveillance](res://index.html#topic=video-surveillance)" and "[Automated license plate readers](res://index.html#topic=automated-license-plate-readers)".
 
2 weeks ago
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