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803 47,879 341,442
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796 45,929 328,798
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7 1,950 12,644
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Threat Library - About
Threat Library - Contribute
Threat Library - Interface 99% 7 1,950 12,644 1
Threat Library - Tutorial

Summary

Project website notrace.how
Instructions for translators

See this page.
Project maintainers1 User avatar ntp
08/23/2026

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Total 803 47,879 341,442
Translated 99% 796 95% 45,929 96% 328,798
Needs editing 1% 7 4% 1,950 3% 12,644
Read-only 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
Failing checks 1% 1 1% 365 1% 2,548
Strings with suggestions 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
Untranslated strings 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
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Resource updated
The “threats/en.json” file was changed. 08/04/2026
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String updated in the repository
[!collection-of-dna-sample.jpg|right|small-web-default-pdf|centerCaption!]
Collection of a DNA sample using a swab.

DNA forensics is the collection and analysis of DNA samples for the purpose of matching DNA samples to individuals.

DNA is the molecule that contains the genetic code of organisms. Every cell[^With the exception of red blood cells.] in a human body has DNA. Each individual's DNA is unique, with the exception of identical twins. An adversary can compare an individual's DNA with a DNA sample collected from an item or location and, if they match, conclude that the individual was likely in contact with that item or location.

# Transfer

Human body cells and the DNA they contain can directly transfer from the body to the environment. For example:

- When you sweat, urinate, defecate, or bleed, you leave sweat, urine, feces, or blood.
- When you breathe or speak, you emit respiratory droplets from your mouth and nose that contain saliva and mucus.
- When you touch a surface with your skin, skin cells transfer from your skin to the surface.
- Even when you're not doing anything, you are constantly shedding skin cells and hair.

Human body cells can also transfer indirectly. For example, if you touch the outside of a pair of gloves with your fingers, then put the gloves on and touch a door handle, your skin cells can transfer first from your fingers to the outside of the gloves and then from the outside of the gloves to the door handle.

See the "Transfer" section of the [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) for more details on direct and indirect DNA transfer.

# Degradation

DNA is very robust and does not easily degrade, but it can degrade under certain conditions, such as when exposed to high temperatures or sodium hypochlorite.

See the "Degradation" section of the [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) on the conditions under which DNA can degrade.

# Collection

An adversary can collect a DNA sample:

- From a surface known to contain DNA, such as a visible biological mark (e.g. saliva or blood).
- From a surface suspected of containing DNA, such as a door handle suspected to have been touched by a suspect at an action site.

An adversary can use techniques to facilitate DNA collection, such as:

- Soot removal techniques to collect DNA samples hidden beneath soot after a fire.
- Luminol to locate blood samples invisible to the naked eye.

# Analysis

An adversary can analyze a DNA sample to identify genetic markers of the DNA. Such an analysis is successful if:

- The sample contains enough DNA. For example, a drop of blood contains significantly more DNA than skin cells left through brief contact between skin and a surface.
- The DNA isn't too degraded.
- All or most of the DNA in the sample is from at most three individuals.

An adversary can compare *two* successfully analyzed DNA samples to:

- Determine whether they come from the same individual. For example, they can compare a DNA sample collected from the mouth of a suspect in custody to a DNA sample collected at an action site and, if they match, conclude that the suspect was likely present at the action site.
- Determine whether they come from individuals closely related genetically, such as parents and their children, siblings, or cousins.

An adversary can also use a *single* successfully analyzed DNA sample to:

- Determine the individual's genetic sex.
- Attempt to predict the individual's appearance using forensic DNA phenotyping. Currently, eye, hair, and skin color can be predicted with relatively high accuracy, and research is ongoing to attempt to predict other characteristics. This technique is not used in all contexts.

# DNA databases

In many countries, the State has DNA databases containing the DNA of many individuals, often obtained during arrests or as part of criminal convictions.

Countries can exchange DNA data with each other through:

- International DNA databases, such as the Interpol DNA database or the Europol Information System.
- Linked or networked national DNA databases. For example, European Union member states are required to maintain a DNA database that other member states can access.
- Request-based exchange of DNA data, typically in cases of serious crimes.

# See also

- [DNA You Say? Burn Everything to Burn Longer: A Guide to Leaving No Traces](res://#dna-you-say) for an overview of DNA forensics.
- The [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) for a collection of useful details on DNA forensics, taken from academic literature.
- The ["DNA" topic](res://#topic=dna).
[!collection-of-dna-sample.jpg|right|small-web-default-pdf|centerCaption!]
Coleta de uma amostra de DNA usando um cotonete.

A perícia forense de DNA consiste na coleta e análise de amostras de DNA com o objetivo de comparar amostras de DNA com indivíduos.

O DNA é a molécula que contém o código genético dos organismos. Todas as células [^Com exceção dos glóbulos vermelhos.] do corpo humano possuem DNA. O DNA de cada indivíduo é único, com exceção dos gêmeos idênticos. Um adversário pode comparar o DNA de um indivíduo com uma amostra de DNA coletada de um item ou local e, se eles corresponderem, concluir que o indivíduo provavelmente teve contato com esse item ou local.

# Transferência

As células do corpo humano e o DNA que elas contêm podem ser transferidos diretamente do corpo para o ambiente. Por exemplo:

- Quando você transpira, urina, defeca ou sangra, deixa suor, urina, fezes ou sangue.
- Quando você respira ou fala, emite gotículas respiratórias da boca e do nariz que contêm saliva e muco.
- Quando você toca uma superfície com a pele, as células da pele são transferidas da sua pele para a superfície.
- Mesmo quando você não está fazendo nada, está constantemente perdendo células da pele e cabelos.

As células do corpo humano também podem ser transferidas indiretamente. Por exemplo, se você tocar a parte externa de um par de luvas com os dedos, depois calçar as luvas e tocar a maçaneta de uma porta, suas células da pele podem ser transferidas primeiro dos dedos para a parte externa das luvas e, em seguida, da parte externa das luvas para a maçaneta da porta.

Consulte a seção “Transferência” da [Revisão da literatura sobre DNA do Projeto No Trace](res://#dna-review) para obter mais detalhes sobre a transferência direta e indireta de DNA.

# Degradação

O DNA é muito robusto e não se degrada facilmente, mas pode se degradar sob certas condições, como quando exposto a altas temperaturas ou hipoclorito de sódio.

Consulte a seção “Degradação” da [Revisão da literatura sobre DNA do Projeto No Trace](res://#dna-review) para saber as condições em que o DNA pode se degradar.

# Coleta

Um adversário pode coletar uma amostra de DNA:

- De uma superfície conhecida por conter DNA, como uma marca biológica visível (por exemplo, saliva ou sangue).
- De uma superfície suspeita de conter DNA, como uma maçaneta de porta suspeita de ter sido tocada por um suspeito em um local de ação.

Um adversário pode usar técnicas para facilitar a coleta de DNA, como:

- Técnicas de remoção de fuligem para coletar amostras de DNA escondidas sob a fuligem após um incêndio.
- Luminol para localizar amostras de sangue invisíveis a olho nu.

# Análise

Um adversário pode analisar uma amostra de DNA para identificar marcadores genéticos do DNA. Essa análise é bem-sucedida se:

- A amostra contiver DNA suficiente. Por exemplo, uma gota de sangue contém significativamente mais DNA do que as células da pele deixadas por um breve contato entre a pele e uma superfície.
- O DNA não estiver muito degradado.
- Todo ou a maior parte do DNA na amostra for de, no máximo, três indivíduos.

Um adversário pode comparar *duas* amostras de DNA analisadas com sucesso para:

- Determinar se elas vêm do mesmo indivíduo. Por exemplo, eles podem comparar uma amostra de DNA coletada da boca de um suspeito sob custódia com uma amostra de DNA coletada em um local de ação e, se elas corresponderem, concluir que o suspeito provavelmente estava presente no local da ação.
- Determinar se elas são de indivíduos geneticamente próximos, como pais e filhos, irmãos ou primos.

Um adversário também pode usar uma *única* amostra de DNA analisada com sucesso para:

- Determinar o sexo genético do indivíduo.
- Tentar prever a aparência do indivíduo usando fenotipagem forense de DNA. Atualmente, a cor dos olhos, cabelos e pele pode ser prevista com relativa precisão, e pesquisas estão em andamento para tentar prever outras características. Essa técnica não é usada em todos os contextos.

# Bancos de dados de DNA

Em muitos países, o Estado possui bancos de dados de DNA contendo o DNA de muitos indivíduos, frequentemente obtido durante prisões ou como parte de condenações criminais.

Os países podem trocar dados de DNA entre si por meio de:

- Bancos de dados internacionais de DNA, como o banco de dados de DNA da Interpol ou o Sistema de Informação da Europol.
- Bancos de dados nacionais de DNA interligados ou em rede. Por exemplo, os Estados-membros da União Europeia são obrigados a manter um banco de dados de DNA que outros Estados-membros possam acessar.
- Troca de dados de DNA com base em solicitações, normalmente em casos de crimes graves.

# Veja também

- [Dna You Say? Burn Everything to Burn Longer: A Guide to Leaving No Traces](res://#dna-you-say) para uma visão geral da perícia forense de DNA.
- A [Revisão da literatura sobre o projeto No Trace DNA](res://#dna-review) para uma coleção de detalhes úteis sobre a ciência forense do DNA, retirados da literatura acadêmica.
- O [tópico “DNA”](res://#topic=dna).
techniques.forensics.dna.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

Source string changed
[!collection-of-dna-sample.jpg|right|small-web-default-pdf|centerCaption!]
Collection of a DNA sample using a swab.

DNA forensics is the collection and analysis of DNA samples for the purpose of matching DNA samples to individuals.

DNA is the molecule that contains the genetic code of organisms. Every cell[^With the exception of red blood cells.] in a human body has DNA. Each individual's DNA is unique, with the exception of identical twins. An adversary can compare an individual's DNA with a DNA sample collected from an item or location and, if they match, conclude that the individual was likely in contact with that item or location.

# Transfer

Human body cells and the DNA they contain can directly transfer from the body to the environment. For example:

- When you sweat, urinate, defecate, or bleed, you leave sweat, urine, feces, or blood.
- When you breathe or speak, you emit respiratory droplets from your mouth and nose that contain saliva and mucus.
- When you touch a surface with your skin, skin cells transfer from your skin to the surface.
- Even when you're not doing anything, you are constantly shedding skin cells and hair.

Human body cells can also transfer indirectly. For example, if you touch the outside of a pair of gloves with your fingers, then put the gloves on and touch a door handle, your skin cells can transfer first from your fingers to the outside of the gloves and then from the outside of the gloves to the door handle.

See the "Transfer" section of the [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) for more details on direct and indirect DNA transfer.

# Degradation

DNA is very robust and does not easily degrade, but it can degrade under certain conditions, such as when exposed to high temperatures or sodium hypochlorite.

See the "Degradation" section of the [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) on the conditions under which DNA can degrade.

# Collection

An adversary can collect a DNA sample:

- From a surface known to contain DNA, such as a visible biological mark (e.g. saliva or blood).
- From a surface suspected of containing DNA, such as a door handle suspected to have been touched by a suspect at an action site.

An adversary can use techniques to facilitate DNA collection, such as:

- Soot removal techniques to collect DNA samples hidden beneath soot after a fire.
- Luminol to locate blood samples invisible to the naked eye.

# Analysis

An adversary can analyze a DNA sample to identify genetic markers of the DNA. Such an analysis is successful if:

- The sample contains enough DNA. For example, a drop of blood contains significantly more DNA than skin cells left through brief contact between skin and a surface.
- The DNA isn't too degraded.
- All or most of the DNA in the sample is from at most three individuals.

An adversary can compare *two* successfully analyzed DNA samples to:

- Determine whether they come from the same individual. For example, they can compare a DNA sample collected from the mouth of a suspect in custody to a DNA sample collected at an action site and, if they match, conclude that the suspect was likely present at the action site.
- Determine whether they come from individuals closely related genetically, such as parents and their children, siblings, or cousins.

An adversary can also use a *single* successfully analyzed DNA sample to:

- Determine the individual's genetic sex.
- Attempt to predict the individual's appearance using forensic DNA phenotyping. Currently, eye, hair, and skin color can be predicted with relatively high accuracy, and research is ongoing to attempt to predict other characteristics. This technique is not used in all contexts.

# DNA databases

In many countries, the State has DNA databases containing the DNA of many individuals, often obtained during arrests or as part of criminal convictions.

Countries can exchange DNA data with each other through:

- International DNA databases, such as the Interpol DNA database or the Europol Information System.
- Linked or networked national DNA databases. For example, European Union member states are required to maintain a DNA database that other member states can access.
- Request-based exchange of DNA data, typically in cases of serious crimes.

# See also

- [DnaNA You Say? Burn Everything to Burn Longer: A Guide to Leaving No Traces](res://#dna-you-say) for an overview of DNA forensics.
- The [No Trace Project DNA Literature Review](res://#dna-review) for a collection of useful details on DNA forensics, taken from academic literature.
- The ["DNA" topic](res://#topic=dna).
techniques.forensics.dna.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

String updated in the repository
Covert surveillance devices are electronic devices hidden by an adversary to collect data: audio, video, and location data.

# Where

An adversary can hide covert surveillance devices in buildings, in or on vehicles, or outdoors. Notable locations include:

- Microphones and cameras hidden inside the home of a target.
- Location trackers hidden in or on the vehicle of a target.
- Cameras hidden at the windows of a building close to the home of a target, such that the cameras can film the entrance to the home.

# When

An adversary can hide covert surveillance devices for long-term surveillance (e.g. weeks, months or years), or short-term surveillance of specific events. A covert surveillance device can disappear:

- Most often, when it is retrieved by its installers.
- In some cases, when it is inadvertently discovered and removed by the people under surveillance.
- In rare cases, when it is deliberately discovered (through a [bug search](tl://mitigations/bug-search.html)) and removed by the people under surveillance.

# Power supply

Covert surveillance devices require a power supply, which can be either a battery or the electrical system of the building or vehicle in which the device is hidden, or both. In rare cases, they may be powered by Power over Ethernet (PoE). To save battery power and make it harder to detect them, devices may not be powered on all the time.

# Data transmission

Covert surveillance devices often transmit the data they collect:

- Most often for low-cost modern devices, over the mobile phone network using a SIM card included in the device.
- In some cases over WiFi, Bluetooth, Ethernet, or arbitrary radio frequencies.

Some devices never transmit the data they collect: to retrieve the data, the adversary needs to physically access them.

# See also

- [Ears and Eyes](eae://).
- The ["Hidden devices" topic](res://#topic=hidden-devices).
Dispositivos de vigilância secreta são dispositivos eletrônicos ocultos por um adversário para coletar dados: áudio, vídeo e dados de localização.

# Onde

Um adversário pode ocultar dispositivos de vigilância secreta em edifícios, dentro ou sobre veículos, ou ao ar livre. Locais notáveis incluem:

- Microfones e câmeras ocultos dentro da casa de um alvo.
- Rastreadores de localização ocultos dentro ou sobre o veículo de um alvo.
- Câmeras escondidas nas janelas de um prédio próximo à casa de um alvo, de forma que as câmeras possam filmar a entrada da casa.

# Quando

Um adversário pode esconder dispositivos de vigilância secretos para vigilância de longo prazo (por exemplo, semanas, meses ou anos) ou vigilância de curto prazo de eventos específicos. Um dispositivo de vigilância secreto pode desaparecer:

- Na maioria das vezes, quando é recuperado por seus instaladores.
- Em alguns casos, quando é inadvertidamente descoberto e removido por terceiros.
- Em casos raros, quando é deliberadamente descoberto (por meio de uma [busca de escutas](tl://mitigations/bug-search.html)) e removido por terceiros.

# Fonte de alimentação

Os dispositivos de vigilância secreta requerem uma fonte de alimentação, que pode ser uma bateria ou o sistema elétrico do edifício ou veículo em que o dispositivo está escondido, ou ambos. Em casos raros, eles podem ser alimentados por Power over Ethernet (PoE). Para economizar energia da bateria e tornar mais difícil a sua detecção, os dispositivos podem não estar sempre ligados.

# Transmissão de dados

Os dispositivos de vigilância secreta geralmente transmitem os dados que coletam:

- Na maioria das vezes, para dispositivos modernos de baixo custo, através da rede de telefonia móvel usando um cartão SIM incluído no dispositivo.
- Em alguns casos, através de WiFi, Bluetooth, Ethernet ou frequências de rádio arbitrárias

Alguns dispositivos nunca transmitem os dados que coletam: para recuperar os dados, o adversário precisa acessá-los fisicamente.

# Veja também

- [Ouvidos e olhos](eae://).
- O tópico ["Dispositivos ocultos"](res://#topic=hidden-devices).
techniques.covert-surveillance-devices.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

Source string changed
Covert surveillance devices are electronic devices hidden by an adversary to collect data: audio, video, and location data.

# Where

An adversary can hide covert surveillance devices in buildings, in or on vehicles, or outdoors. Notable locations include:

- Microphones and cameras hidden inside the home of a target.
- Location trackers hidden in or on the vehicle of a target.
- Cameras hidden at the windows of a building close to the home of a target, such that the cameras can film the entrance to the home.

# When

An adversary can hide covert surveillance devices for long-term surveillance (e.g. weeks, months or years), or short-term surveillance of specific events. A covert surveillance device can disappear:

- Most often, when it is retrieved by its installers.
- In some cases, when it is inadvertently discovered and removed by a third partythe people under surveillance.
- In rare cases, when it is deliberately discovered (through a [bug search](tl://mitigations/bug-search.html)) and removed by a third partythe people under surveillance.

# Power supply

Covert surveillance devices require a power supply, which can be either a battery or the electrical system of the building or vehicle in which the device is hidden, or both. In rare cases, they may be powered by Power over Ethernet (PoE). To save battery power and make it harder to detect them, devices may not be powered on all the time.

# Data transmission

Covert surveillance devices often transmit the data they collect:

- Most often for low-cost modern devices, over the mobile phone network using a SIM card included in the device.
- In some cases over WiFi, Bluetooth, Ethernet, or arbitrary radio frequencies.

Some devices never transmit the data they collect: to retrieve the data, the adversary needs to physically access them.

# See also

- [Ears and Eyes](eae://).
- The ["Hidden devices" topic](res://#topic=hidden-devices).
techniques.covert-surveillance-devices.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

String updated in the repository
A covert house visit is a discreet visit of a residence conducted by an adversary when the occupants are not present.

An adversary can conduct a covert house visit to:

- Gather information.
- Install [covert surveillance devices](tl://techniques/covert-surveillance-devices.html) in the residence.
- Install [malware](tl://techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/malware.html) on digital devices.

Generally, when an adversary conducts a covert visit of a residence, they do not want the occupants to know that the operation has taken place. Therefore, in general:

- If the residence has locked doors, the adversary must bypass the doors without visibly breaking them. They can do this by picking the locks or asking the building owner for the keys.
- The adversary refrains from seizing items or moving things.

In addition to visiting the residence, the adversary can covertly seize garbage from outside the residence in the hope of finding valuable information (e.g., written notes, forensic evidence such as DNA traces).
Uma visita secreta a uma residência é uma visita discreta realizada por um adversário quando os ocupantes não estão presentes.

Um adversário pode realizar uma visita secreta a uma residência para:

- Coletar informações.
- Instalar [dispositivos de vigilância secretos](tl://techniques/covert-surveillance-devices.html) na residência.
- Instalar [malware](tl://techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/malware.html) em dispositivos digitais.

Geralmente, quando um adversário realiza uma visita secreta a uma residência, ele não quer que os ocupantes saibam que a operação ocorreu. Portanto, em geral:

- Se a residência tiver portas trancadas, o adversário deve contornar as portas sem quebrá-las visivelmente. Ele pode fazer isso arrombando as fechaduras ou pedindo as chaves ao proprietário do imóvel.
- O adversário evita apreender itens ou mover objetos.

Além de visitar a residência, o adversário pode apreender secretamente o lixo do lado de fora da residência na esperança de encontrar informações valiosas (por exemplo, notas escritas, evidências forenses, como vestígios de DNA).
techniques.covert-house-visit.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

Source string changed
A covert house visit is a discreet visit of a residence conducted by an adversary when the occupants are not present.

An adversary can conduct a covert house visit to:

- Gather information.
- Install [covert surveillance devices](tl://techniques/covert-surveillance-devices.html) in the residence.
- Install [malware](tl://techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/malware.html) on digital devices.

Generally, when an adversary conducts a covert visit of a residence, they do not want the occupants to know that the operation has taken place. Therefore, in general:

- If the residence has locked doors, the adversary must bypass the doors without visibly breaking them. They can do this by picking the locks or asking the building owner for the keys.
- The adversary refrains from seizing items or moving things.

In addition to visiting the residence, the adversary can covertly seize garbage from outside the residence in the hope of finding valuable information (e.g., written notes, forensics evidence such as DNA traces).
techniques.covert-house-visit.description
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

String updated in the repository
DNA samples matching Louna's DNA were collected from:[^Private source.]

- A garbage bag and a surgical mask, partially burned, seized near the burned excavator.
- A pair of shorts seized in her hospital room while she was hospitalized.
- A paper cup seized when she was taken into custody.
- A spoon and a napkin seized while she was in custody, after a meal.

DNA samples matching the DNA of a person seen asking after Louna in the corridors of the hospital were collected from:

- A pair of shorts seized in Louna's hospital room while she was hospitalized.
- A surgical mask found in the shorts.

Unusable DNA samples were collected from:

- A partially burned hammer found in the cab of the burned excavator, the window of which had been broken.
- A torch—a piece of wood tipped with a cloth soaked in flammable liquid—found near the burned excavator.
Amostras de ADN que combinam com o ADN de Louna foram recolhidas de: [^Fonte privada.]

- Um saco do lixo e uma máscara cirúrgica, parcialmente queimados, apreendidos perto da escavadora queimada.
- Um par de calções apreendidos no seu quarto do hospital enquanto ela estava internada.
- Um copo de papel apreendido quando ela foi detida.
- Uma colher e um guardanapo apreendidos enquanto ela estava detida, após uma refeição.

Amostras de ADN que correspondem ao ADN de uma pessoa vista a perguntar por Louna nos corredores do hospital foram recolhidas de:

- Um par de calções apreendido no quarto de hospital de Louna enquanto ela estava internada.
- Uma máscara cirúrgica encontrada nos calções.

Amostras de ADN inutilizáveis foram recolhidas de:

- Um martelo parcialmente queimado encontrado na cabine da escavadora queimada, cuja janela tinha sido quebrada.
- Uma tocha — um pedaço de madeira com uma ponta de pano embebido em líquido inflamável — encontrada perto da escavadora queimada.
operations.case-against-louna.techniques.forensics.dna
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

Source string changed
DNA samples matching Louna's DNA were collected from:[^Private source.]

- A garbage bag and a surgical mask, partially burned, seized near the burned excavator.
- A pair of shorts seized in her hospital room while she was hospitalized.
- A paper cup seized when she was taken into custody.
- A spoon and a napkin seized while she was in custody, after a meal.

DNA samples matching the DNA of a person seen asking after Louna in the corridors of the hospital were collected from:

- A pair of shorts seized in Louna's hospital room while she was hospitalized.
- A surgical mask found in the shorts.

Unusable DNA samples were collected from:

- A partially burned hammer found in the cab of the burned excavator, the window of which had been broken.
- A torch—a piece of wood tipped with a cloth soaked in flammable liquid—found near the burned excavator.
operations.case-against-louna.techniques.forensics.dna
08/04/2026
User avatar ntp

String updated in the repository
In June 2020, people were arrested in Spain and France, thanks to cooperation between Italian, Spanish, and French intelligence and police forces.[^https://malacoda.noblogs.org/anarchici-imprigionati]

During the investigation Italian cops tried to target a person living in Germany.[^https://attaque.noblogs.org/post/2022/02/20/italie-allemagne-de-rome-a-bialystok-en-passant-par-berlin] They sent several requests to German police to extradite the person or have their house searched but the requests were rejected.
Em junho de 2020, algumas pessoas foram presas na Espanha e na França, graças à cooperação entre as forças policiais e de inteligência italianas, espanholas e francesas. [^https://malacoda.noblogs.org/anarchici-imprigionati]

Durante a investigação, a polícia italiana tentou localizar uma pessoa que morava na Alemanha.[^https://attaque.noblogs.org/post/2022/02/20/italie-allemagne-de-rome-a-bialystok-en-passant-par-berlin] Eles mandaram vários pedidos para a polícia alemã para extraditar a pessoa ou fazer uma busca na casa dela, mas os pedidos foram rejeitados.
operations.bialystok.techniques.international-cooperation
08/04/2026
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